上世界三十年代威尔逊政府将所得税合法化，一些年后，联邦财政的 80% 来自公司和个人所得税。这意味着一旦一般经济急剧下降，联邦税收也会相应下降，政府无法正常运营。
与此同时，各种设备，如农产品价格支持和失业补偿，已经融入了我们的法律体系。在正是经济下滑严重减少联邦政府收入的时候，由立法规定的在这些领域的支出会导致政府支出急剧增加。再加上明确的意图通过减税、兴建更多公共工程和向各种陷入困境的商业团体提供贷款来扭转不利的经济趋势。
这意味着当经济衰退发生时，它很可能会比过去某些大萧条期间的情况短暂。对于财务实力足够强大或具有借款能力以经受住一两年困难时期的增长型公司的股东来说，根据今天的经济条件，经济下滑更多地代表了他持有资产的市场价值暂时缩水，而不是投资本身的根本威胁。
摘自 1957 年 Philip Fisher 的 Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits。
Even if this change in policy had not become generally accepted, certain other changes have occurred that would produce much the same results, though possibly not so quickly. The income tax only became legal during the Wilson administration. It was not a major influence on the economy until the 1930's. In earlier years, much of the federal revenue came from customs duties and similar excise sources. These fluctuated moderately with the level of prosperity but as a whole were fairly stable. Today, in contrast, about 80 per cent of the federal revenue comes from corporate and personal income taxes. This means that any sharp decline in the general level of business causes a corresponding decline in federal revenue.
Meanwhile, various devices such as farm price supports and unemployment compensation have become imbedded in our laws. At just the time that a business decline would be greatly reducing the federal government’s income, expenditures in these fields made mandatory by legislation would cause governmental expenses to mount sharply. Add to this the definite intention of reversing any unfavorable business trend by cutting taxes, building more public works, and lending money to various hard-pressed business groups, and it becomes increasingly plain that if a real depression were to occur the federal deficit could easily run at a rate of $25 to $30 billion per annum. Deficits of this type would produce further inflation in much the same way that the deficits resulting from wartime expenditures produced the major price spirals of the postwar period.
This means that when a depression does occur it is apt to be shorter than some of the great depressions of the past. It is almost bound to be followed by enough further inflation to produce the type of general price rise that in the past has helped certain industries and hurt others. With this general economic background, the menace of the business cycle may well be as great as it ever was for the stockholder in the financially weak or marginal company. But to the’ stockholder in the growth company with sufficient financial strength or borrowing ability to withstand a year or two of hard times, a business decline under today’s economic conditions represents far more a temporary shrinking of the market value of his holdings than the basic threat to the very existence of the investment itself that had to be reckoned with prior to 1932.
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